A steady stream of cheap Russian‑made drones and rockets are now skirting the Polish border, loitering at low altitudes and slow speeds that baffle conventional radar. The result: a growing threat that could strike civilian and military sites alike if current air‑defence measures are not upgraded.
Russian Missiles Over Ukraine
Every month, Russia dispatches several thousand missile and drone launches over Ukraine, with a recent night from August 19–20 bringing 95 rockets and drones to the region, 63 of which were intended for neutralisation. These low‑profile weapons now spill over into Polish airspace, threatening both border and inland targets.
The Low‑Cost, Low‑Fly Gierian‑2 Drones
The so‑called Gierian‑2 (a licensed and locally tweaked version of the Iranian Szahed‑136) relies on a basic four‑cylinder, two‑stroke engine and a simple two‑bladed propeller. These inexpensive pickups cruise under 300 m altitude and at about 180 km/h, making them cheap yet elusive adversaries that can be mass‑deployed at a fraction of the cost of standard missiles.
Low and Slow, Yet Stealthy Targets
Because they glide slowly and silently, Gierian‑2 drones are easy to hear and sometimes visible, earning Ukrainians the nickname “moped.” Polish forces, however, are not equipped to spot such low‑profile flight paths, especially when the drones operate in narrow, low‑speed corridors that most radar systems purposely ignore to avoid bird “false‑alarms.”
Detection Challenges at the Polish Border
Poland’s air‑space monitoring relies on fixed radar posts designed primarily for high‑speed aircraft. The curvature of the Earth and the low altitude of Gierian‑2 drones reduce the radar horizon to only a few kilometres, leaving sizable gaps in coverage. Moreover, radars filter out slow‑moving objects, which further hampers early warning of these inbound threats.
Limited Defensive Options
The country cannot afford to blanket its borders with anti‑air batteries or employ every piece of its fleet against such cheap drones. While fighter jets could theoretically intercept a single intruder, doing so for every low‑altitude weapon would be logistically prohibitive and economically wasteful, especially when missiles designed to kill such targets may not exist in sufficient quantity.
Incidents and Skirmishes
Although Poland has recorded very few impacts—one confirmed missile near Bydgoszcz and a likely Gierian‑2 loss in the Osiny region—the frequency of nightly incursions (hundreds of drones over neighbouring states) is eroding confidence in national air‑defence. Should a more lethal weapon cross the border, the stakes would rise sharply.
Poland’s Current Radar Capabilities
The army owns only two Saab‑340 aircraft equipped with radar, insufficient to maintain a continuous presence over the entire border. While Allied partners operate comparable platforms, their coverage is not 24 / 7. National plans call for aerosol radar buoys—part of the so‑called “Barbara” program—with a launch price of $960 million, yet the first unit will not be ready until 2026.
Future Protection Plans
Poland aims to improve its detection by accelerating the Barbara program and purchasing additional airborne radars, before considering the introduction of MRO aircraft such as the FA‑50 and F‑16 capable of intercepting low‑flyer threats. These measures, while potentially costly, are deemed essential for safeguarding vital military and civilian assets.
Call to Action
The time is now for the Ministry of National Defence to fast‑track upgrades in surveillance and interceptor capabilities. As the density of Russian low‑altitude activity increases, the likelihood of an inadvertent breach into Polish territory grows—an outcome no country can afford to risk.
Source: Gazeta,
