Polish Justice Minister Waldemar Żurek’s October proposal to split judges into three groups has drawn sharp criticism from the civil‑rights ombudsman, who warns it violates constitutional and European standards and could deepen the country’s judicial crisis.
Three‑Tier Judge Reclassification
Minister Żurek’s bill divides judges into green, yellow and red categories. The green group—about 1,100 young judges—would retain senior posts. Yellow judges, promoted from a new system, would return to prior ranks but could contest current appointments. The red group, totaling roughly 1,500, includes judges ineligible for the Supreme Court or higher administrative court, prosecutors, and legal advisers placed in judge roles.
Ombudsman’s Review and Concerns
Civil‑rights ombudsman Marcin Wiącek states the bill “undermines the rule of law” that began with the 2018 reformation of the National Judicial Council and calls for urgent legislative intervention in line with constitutional and international standards.
Grounding in Case Law
Wiącek argues the draft relies on a faulty premise that judges appointed after 6 March 2018 were never legally judges. He notes no European Court of Human Rights, EU Court of Justice or Polish supreme courts have confirmed such a view; instead, case law recognizes their judgeship status despite procedural defects.
Procedural versus Legislative Authority
The ombudsman stresses that changes in a judge’s status must arise from an individual court verdict, not a broad legislative act, citing Article 180 (2) of the Constitution. He warns that the bill fails to align with rulings of the ECHR, EU Court, and national courts.
Risk of Amplifying the Crisis
Automatic resignation or transfer of about 1,500 judges without due process violates proportionality, the right to court access, reputation protection and effective remedy guarantees. If contested under the ECHR, the bill could lead to rulings that further entrench the judicial crisis and spark disputes over judge status.
Inconsistencies and Potential Remedies
Wiącek points to internal contradictions: the draft sometimes treats the National Judicial Council as non‑existent, at other times as a competent body issuing binding resolutions. He notes a positive element—a proposal to allow courts to annul conflicting judgments—but highlights gaps in extraordinary appeal procedures that leave legal remedies incomplete.
