A Senate proposal in Poland seeks to overhaul the electoral administration, granting the Minister of Justice significant control over electoral commissioners and bypassing the State Electoral Commission.
Potential Purge in Electoral Administration?
A Senate project aims to replace the entire electoral apparatus within a month, placing personnel decisions in the hands of a politician. Should the State Electoral Commission (PKW) object, the project proposes circumventing it through the Supreme Court.
Simultaneously, the Sejm is enacting a separate amendment addressing the same issues. Dariusz Lasocki, a legal counsel and former member of the PKW, questions whether anyone is managing the crucial legislative process concerning electoral law just 18 months before the elections.
Senate Proposal: Restructuring Electoral Administration
Senate document 638, submitted on February 18, 2026, proposes a restructuring of the electoral administration on a scale not seen since 2017. The plan includes reducing the number of electoral commissioners (from 100 to 49), limiting eligibility to judges (currently including individuals with legal higher education), and transferring appointment powers from the Ministry of Interior and Administration to the Minister of Justice.
The project also foresees the immediate expiration of the terms of all commissioners and electoral officials, despite Article 166 § 3 of the Electoral Code stipulating five-year terms.
Supreme Court as a Substitute Authority
A far-reaching proposal from the Senate grants the Supreme Court substitute authority in cases of inaction by the PKW regarding the appointment of commissioners, and establishes the position of a district electoral commission secretary appointed by the mayor. Senators are also considering transferring the PKW’s authority to determine the number of mandates in districts through a resolution.
Each of these changes individually warrants in-depth debate. Together, they create a structure whose institutional coherence raises serious doubts, shared by Professor Andrzej Jackiewicz, who noted that while most proposed solutions fall within the legislator’s regulatory freedom, enacting the project in its current form could pose a significant risk of constitutional challenges.
Circumventing the PKW Mechanism
According to the project, if the PKW fails to appoint new electoral commissioners within thirty days of the law’s enactment, the Supreme Court will appoint them. The Supreme Administrative Court criticized this solution, arguing that such a profound change to the structure of electoral administration could occur during a legislative quiet period just before parliamentary elections.
The PKW considers the regulation unnecessary, stating that in its thirty-five-year history as a permanent electoral body, it has never shirked its statutory obligations.
Deeper Concerns: Commission Authority and Conflict of Interest
The core issue extends beyond the appointment timeline. If the Commission deems candidates presented by the Minister of Justice unqualified or lacking the necessary guarantees of proper performance, as stipulated in Article 166 § 3 of the Electoral Code, and refuses their appointment, the Minister would resubmit the same candidates to the Supreme Court – which would then appoint them. This would reduce the Commission to a mere notarial role.
This represents a previously unknown mechanism for bypassing the decisions of the body the Electoral Code defines as “permanent” and “supreme” in electoral matters. It weakens the electoral administration system and introduces a new actor: the Supreme Court. Critically, it is the same Supreme Court – specifically the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber – that rules on the validity of elections. The Senate project would have the Supreme Court evaluate the actions of bodies it itself appointed, creating a clear conflict of interest.
Judicial Monolith and Lack of Safeguards
The argument for the apolitical nature of judges – a cornerstone of the project’s justification – is difficult to maintain without reservations in 2026. Judges have become politically engaged and remain so. The project lacks a substantive explanation of how returning to a judicial model would improve the current situation, where commissioners can also be legal counsels, advocates, or notaries.
Why not revert to a judicial composition of the PKW, a change previously protested by the current opposition (Civic Coalition, PSL) as a “return to the Polish People’s Republic,” a “Stalinist return,” or a “political attack on the PKW”?
Past Challenges and Potential Disruption
During the 2020 Presidential election, mass resignations of judges from district electoral commissions caused serious staffing problems. The PKW managed, but this should not be repeated. Making the entire electoral apparatus dependent on a single profession, in the current climate of conflict, makes it highly probable that there will be no one to conduct the elections.
The current Minister of Justice is unlikely to propose anyone from the group of 3000 judges appointed by the current National Council of the Judiciary, leading to discrimination and selectivity.
Political Secretary and Legislative Chaos
Recalling problems in district electoral commissions in 2025, senators propose creating the position of a commission secretary, to be appointed by the commissioner from candidates nominated by the mayor – a local politician and the superior of municipal employees. This secretary would have broad powers, effectively acting as a co-chair, coordinating vote counting, checking ballots, and preparing the protocol.
The lack of any influence from electoral committees on this appointment raises significant concerns. Simultaneously, a similar amendment to the Electoral Code is being processed in the Sejm, creating a chaotic situation inconsistent with the postulate of stable electoral law.
PKW Authority Over Mandate Allocation
The proposed changes would grant the State Electoral Commission the authority to determine the number of parliamentary mandates in individual constituencies through a resolution, with annual verification based on data from the Central Voters’ Register – a “demographic correction.”
Adjusting the number of mandates to population changes is a real and long-standing need, particularly advocated by the PKW. However, with the current composition of the PKW – as an observer of its activities since 2023 – this power carries the risk of instrumentalization. A statutory algorithm for automatic recalculation would be a more appropriate solution.
A Weak Foundation for Reform
The justification for the project, presented by Senator Waldy Dzikowski, is concise, citing a “record number of electoral protests” after the 2025 presidential elections as the catalyst for changes to the Electoral Code. However, the reality is that tens of thousands of these protests (submitted to the Supreme Court) were flawed, incomplete, or copied and pasted.
Allegations against members of district commissions were not substantiated by the prosecutor’s office and were dismissed. Errors were considered errors, not deliberate fraud. A new regulatory framework should not be built on such a fragile foundation. Electoral administration needs reform, but it must be thoughtful, consensual, and with sufficient lead time – not a year before elections, in thirty days, or under the dictates of a single minister.
