A missile test near Jasnyj, Orenburg region, Russia, exploded on 28 November, likely a test of the RS‑28 Sarmat.
Rocket in Trouble
The launch footage shows that the rocket failed shortly after ignition. The pedestal launcher did not separate as planned, leading to the main engine firing off, the vehicle veering off course and overturning.
During the tumbling, fragments detached, including what appears to be a special retarding device that normally ejects rockets from Soviet-era silos.
The video also shows
Satellite and video evidence indicates the missile used liquid propulsion. Russian ICBMs historically employed dimethylhydrazine and dinitrogen tetroxide, known for high efficiency and toxic fumes that produce an orange‑tinted smoke plume.
Current Russian ICBMs carrying liquid fuels include the R‑36M Vostok, the UR‑100UTTKh, and the new RS‑28 Sarmat, which is still under testing.
Why would this last one fail?
The flight was announced as a test, with NOTAM notices directing aircraft and ships to the Kura training range in Kamchatka.
U.S. forces were aware, having flown an RC‑135S Cobra Ball reconnaissance aircraft over the area two days earlier to watch ICBM warheads enter the atmosphere.
Analyst Paweł Podwig notes the RS‑36M Vostok has rarely been tested since 2013 and is unlikely to be used again.
Another Major Failure?
The only remaining candidate for the failure is the RS‑28 Sarmat, intended to replace the Vostok/Satan missile.
In autumn 2024 the Sarmat test exploded at Plesetsk, destroying the sole test silo used, which has not been rebuilt.
In spring 2025 tests resumed at a 13th Division silo, which also failed during a Friday launch—satellite imagery does not clarify whether it was a repurposed Vostok silo.
A Heavy Blow to Strategic Forces
Russia currently holds about forty RS‑36M missiles in silos of the 13th and 32nd Divisions, each capable of carrying up to ten warheads—about 30‑40 % of the country’s land‑based nuclear arsenal.
These missiles date from the late Soviet era and were maintained with Ukrainian assistance into the 2010s, with expected service until around 2020. The Sarmat delays suggest replacement may be postponed until 2030 or later.
Higher failure probability on older systems and the Sarmat’s setbacks raise doubts about the reliability and credibility of Russia’s strategic deterrent.
