Western military analysts visit Ukraine’s front lines each quarter, observing that current clashes resemble a war between a small Soviet army and a much larger one.
Visit Frequency and Coordination
Since autumn 2022 analysts have undertaken 10‑12 day trips to Kyiv and then to border regions, visiting command posts 10‑30 km from the front. These visits require cooperation from the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.
Early Optimism and Rapid Realignment
During the first trip in late‑fall 2022–early‑winter, Ukrainians celebrated the Kharkiv offensive and expected a third offensive in 2023. By winter 2022‑23, intense fighting in Bakhmut eroded that confidence, and by July 2023 the failed Zaporizhzhia offensive exposed systemic problems in recruitment, training and equipment.
Human Factor: Fatigue, Morale and Recruitment
Soldiers, many in their early forties, have fought for almost three years, leading to growing exhaustion and a rising average age of infantry at the front. Monthly mobilisation of about 30 000 men has stalled, while Ukrainian deserter figures climbed to over 20 000 in October alone.
Desertion Rates and Report Accuracy
Official reports frequently fail to capture true manpower losses; units may request 100 troops but deliver only 30 because ten civilians quietly desert. Inconsistent position reporting further hampers operational planning.
Command Reactions and Decision Delays
Operational decisions are made at high headquarters, delaying battlefield responses by hours or days. Battalion commanders, therefore, must often act independently to avoid larger casualties.
Small Unit Tactics and Counter‑Operations
National Guard units, though lightly equipped, excel in intelligence gathering, timing of Russian wake‑up drills, and executing attacks on logistical nodes. Their ability to plan attacks months in advance showcases disciplined execution.
Russian Drone and Infiltration Dynamics
Russian forces employ massed drone swarms and small infiltrating teams. Machine‑pushed infiltration, guided by drones, bends Ukrainian logistics, but lacks coordinated planning, relying instead on brute force and looks‑and‑feel tactics.
Ukrainian Production Limits and New Threats
Ukrainian industrial capacity remains limited, producing mostly low‑tech drones. The newly introduced Russian “Rubikon” unit disrupts Ukrainian supply lines within 10–20 km of the front, further straining defenses.
Strategic Outlook and Systemic Challenges
Ukraine’s struggle to stabilize its front line remains, hindered by recruitment, training and command inefficiencies. Without decisive political‑military reforms, its prospects of reversing the Russian advance are slim.
