The Supreme Court’s Controversial Doctrine on Attorney Illness and Filing Deadlines
A recent Supreme Court ruling has sparked legal backlash by suggesting that professional attorneys must anticipate potential illness when scheduling court filings, prompting a formal protest from the...
A recent Supreme Court ruling has sparked legal backlash by suggesting that professional attorneys must anticipate potential illness when scheduling court filings, prompting a formal protest from the Polish Bar Council.
Table Of Content
The Controversy Over Professional Foresight
The Supreme Court’s decision from April 28, 2026 (III CZ 44/26), has ignited a firestorm within the legal community. The ruling implies that when an attorney plans to file documents near a deadline, they must account for the possibility of falling ill, effectively demanding a degree of clairvoyance from legal professionals.
Critics argue that this requirement confuses professional diligence with the ability to predict one’s own health. Legal associations, including the Presidium of the Supreme Bar Council, have voiced strong opposition, questioning whether such standards are legally and ethically sound.
Case Background and the Supreme Court’s Rationale
The dispute stems from a case where an attorney missed a deadline to provide copies of a cassation complaint. After being summoned on May 16, 2025, to provide copies within a week, the attorney missed the June 13 deadline, later citing a medical leave taken between June 11 and 13. The Supreme Court rejected the application to restore the deadline, ruling that the illness did not justify the inaction during the preceding days.
Judge Ewa Stefańska emphasized that the assessment of fault is always based on the individual circumstances of a case. The court concluded that since the requirement to provide copies was known since June 6, a three-day illness at the end of the term was insufficient to justify the delay.
Legal Formalism vs. Access to Justice
Legal expert Robert Nogacki criticizes the ruling as a “textbook example” of how difficult facts can produce bad law. He argues that by treating a secondary, technical requirement—the submission of copies—as a fatal procedural error, the court has prioritized rigid formalism over the fundamental right to a fair trial.
The core of the criticism is that procedural requirements should act as a sieve to manage filings, not a torpedo to sink cases. Experts suggest that the legislature should intervene to ensure that deadlines for formal corrections can be restored in cases of involuntary default, protecting the rights of the parties involved.


